Abstract-This work considers the problem of reaching consensus in linear networks with misbehaving agents. A solution to this problem is relevant for several tasks in multiagent systems including motion coordination, clock synchronization, and cooperative estimation. By modelling the misbehaving nodes as unknown and unmeasurable inputs affecting the network, we recast the problem into a system theoretic framework. Only relying on their direct measurements, the agents detect and identify uncooperative behaviors using fault detection and isolation techniques. We consider both the cases of Byzantine as well as non-colluding faults, and we express the solvability conditions of the two cases in terms of the observability properties of a linear system associated with the network, and from a graph theoretic perspective. It is shown that generically any node can correctly detect and identify the misbehaving agents, provided that the connectivity of the network is sufficiently high. Precisely, for a linear consensus network to be generically resilient to k concurrent faults, the connectivity of the communication graph needs to be 2k + 1, if Byzantine agents are allowed, and k +1, if non-colluding agents are considered.
I. INTRODUCTION Distributed systems and networks have received much attention in the last years because of their flexibility and computation performance. One of the most frequent task to be accomplished by autonomous agents is to agree upon some parameters. Agreement variables represent quantities of interest such as the work load in a network of parallel computers, the clock speed for wireless sensor networks, the velocity, the rendezvous point, or the formation pattern for a team of autonomous vehicles; e.g., see [1] , [2] , [3] .
Several algorithms achieving consensus have been proposed and studied in the computer science community [4] . In this work, we consider linear iterations, where, at each time instant, each node updates its state as a weighted combination of its own value and those received from its neighbors [1] , [2] . The choice of algorithm weights is a parameter that influences the convergence speed toward the steady state value [5] .
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Antonio Bicchi is with the Centro I. R. "E. Piaggio," Università di Pisa. Francesco Bullo is with the Center for Control, Dynamical Systems and Computation, University of California at Santa Barbara, bullo@engineering.ucsb.edu . systems are prone to attacks and components failure, and it is of increasing importance to guarantee trustworthy computation even in the presence of misbehaving parts. The misbehaving agents are here classified, depending on their abilities, as Byzantine, or malicious, and as non-colluding, or faulty. Malicious agents have complete knowledge of the network, and posses unlimited sensing, communication, and computation capabilities. Also, they collude in order to cause the biggest damage to the network. On the other hand, faulty agents do not cooperate maliciously, and their uncooperative behavior is often due to an hardware failure. When malicious agents are present, the worst case scenario for the network has to be considered, whereas, in the presence of faulty agents, atypical agents behaviors, i.e., those occurring in practice with zero probability, are not taken into account.
Reaching unanimity in an unreliable system is an important problem well known by computer scientists interested in distributed computing. A first characterization of the resilience of distributed systems to Byzantine attacks appears in [6] , where the authors consider the task of agreeing upon a binary message sent by a "general," when the communication graph is complete. In [7] the resilience of a partially connected 1 network seeking consensus is analyzed, and it is shown that the well-behaving agents of a network can always agree upon a parameter if and only if the number of malicious agents (i) is less than one-half of the network connectivity, and (ii) it is less than one-third of the number of processors. This result has to be regarded as a fundamental limitation of the ability of a distributed consensus system to sustain arbitrary malfunctioning: the presence of misbehaving Byzantine processors can be tolerated only if their number satisfies the above threshold, independently of whatever consensus protocol is adopted.
In this work, we consider linear consensus algorithms in which every agent, including the misbehaving ones, are assumed to send the same information to all their neighbors. This assumption appears to be realistic for most control scenarios. In a sensing network for instance, the data used in the consensus protocol consist of the measurements taken directly by the agents, and it is assumed that the measurements regarding the same quantity coincide. Also, in a broadcast network, the information is transmitted using broadcast messages, so that the content of a message is the same for all the receiving nodes. The problem of characterizing the resilience properties of linear consensus strategies has been partially addressed in recent works [8] , [9] , [10] , where, for the malicious case, it is shown that, despite the limited abilities of the misbehaving agents, the resilience to external attacks is still limited by the connectivity of the network. In [8] the problem of detecting and identifying misbehaving agents in a linear consensus network is first introduced, and a solution is proposed for the single faulty agent case. In [9] , [10] , the authors provide a policy that k malicious agents can follow to prevent some of the nodes of a 2k-connected network from computing the desired function of the initial state, or, equivalently, from reaching an agreement. On the contrary, if the connectivity is 2k + 1 or more, then the authors show that generically the set of misbehaving nodes is identified independent of its behavior, so that the desired consensus is eventually reached. In this paper, we extend and improve the results along these directions, e.g., by characterizing the complete set of policies that make a set of k malicious agents undetectable or unidentifiable, and by providing the resilience bounds in the case of faulty agents. Our approach also differs from the existing computer science literature, e.g., our analysis leads to the development of algorithms that can be easily extended to work on both discrete and continuous time linear consensus networks, and also with partial knowledge of the network topology.
The main contributions of this work are as follows. By recasting the problem of consensus computation in unreliable networks into a system theoretic framework, we provide alternative and constructive proofs of existing bounds on the number of identifiable Byzantine agents in a linear network. Precisely, we show that k malicious agents can be detected and identified if the network is (2k + 1)-connected, and they cannot be identified if the network is (2k)-connected or less. We exhaustively describe the strategies that the malicious nodes can follow to disrupt a linear network that is not sufficiently connected. In particular, we prove that the inputs that allow the misbehaving agents to remain undetected or unidentified coincide with the zero inputs of a linear system associated with the consensus network. Also, we show that the set of such inputs has zero Lebesgue measure in the input space, so that it can be ignored if only faulty agents are considered. For the latter case (non-colluding agents), we provide a comprehensive novel analysis on the detection and identification of misbehaving agents problem. We show that k faulty agents can be identified if the network is (k + 1)-connected, and they cannot if the network is k-connected or less. The proposed resilience bounds are shown to be generic with respect to the network communication weights, i.e., given a consensus topology, the bounds hold for almost all choices of the communication weights. In the last part of the paper, we discuss the problem of detecting and identifying misbehaving agents when either the partial knowledge of the network, or the hardware limitation, makes it impossible to implement the exact identification procedure. We describe a heuristic, which has low complexity, and that ultimately leads to a prompt recovery of the network functionalities from non-colluding malfunctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II recalls some basic facts on the fault detection and isolation problem for linear systems. In Section III we describe the consensus model under consideration. Section IV contains the conditions under which the misbehaving agents are detectable and identifiable, and Section V deals with the genericity of such conditions. Section VI presents our algorithmic procedures. Sections VII and VIII contain respectively our numerical studies and our conclusions.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
We will be using the same notation as in [11] . Throughout the paper, let the triple (A, B, C) denote the linear discrete time system
and let the subspaces B and C denote respectively the image space Im(B) and the null space Ker(C).
A state trajectory x(t) of (1) can be controlled on a subspace V if and only if this is a (A, B)-controlled invariant. The set of all controlled invariants contained in C admits a supremum, which we denote with V * , and which corresponds to the locus of all possible state trajectories of (1) invisible at the output. On the other hand, a conditioned invariant S is a subspace such that there exists an observer for the system (1) for the factor space X /S. The set of the conditioned invariants containing B admits an infimum, which we denote with S * . In a linear system, the presence of sensors failure and actuators malfunction is usually modeled by adding some unknown and unmeasurable functions u i to the nominal system, so that the dynamic model becomes
The matrices B i and the functions u i are referred to as failure signatures and failure modes. By definition, when the failure i is not acting, the corresponding function u i is constantly equal to zero. Given the system (2), the fault detection and isolation problem is to design a dynamic residual generator that takes the observables y(t) and generates a set of residual vectors r i (t), such that 1) every residual r i (t) decays to zero if no failure is present, and 2) the nonzero residuals, allow to uniquely identify the failures. From [11] , [12] we know the following result. 
where V Theorem II.1 guarantees the existence of a filter whose output r i , which is referred to as the i-th residual, is affected only by the dynamics generated by the i-th failure signature.
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Moreover, the transfer function between the signature i and the residual r i is left-invertible, i.e., when the initial condition of the residual generator and that of the system coincide, the mapping from u i to r i is one to one. Note that Theorem II.1 does not provide the solvability conditions for the detection and identification of misbehaving agents in a linear consensus network, because the misbehaving nodes, and hence the failure signatures, are unknown.
III. LINEAR CONSENSUS IN THE PRESENCE OF MISBEHAVING AGENTS
Let G be a directed graph, V its vertex set, and E its edge set. The connectivity of G is the maximum number of disjoint paths between any two vertices of the graph, or, equivalently, the minimum number of vertices in a vertex cutset [13] . Denote with N i the neighbors set of the node i ∈ V , i.e., all the nodes j ∈ V such that the pair (j, i) ∈ E. Consider the discrete time linear consensus system
in which the row stochastic and primitive matrix A is such that the (i, j)-th entry equals the weight of the communication edge from j to i, and in which the vector x contains the real numbers (state) associated with the agents [1] . In the sequel, we assume that the graph associated with the consensus matrix A is not complete.
As it is shown in [8] , algorithms of the form (4) have no resilience to malfunctions and external attacks, and the failure of one or more agents prevents the entire network from reaching the desired consensus. We model the presence of the misbehaving node i using an exogenous input in the i-th position, so that, if the set of the misbehaving nodes is K = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . } ⊂ V , the consensus system becomes
where, being e j the j-th vector of the canonical basis, the input matrix is B K = [e i1 e i2 · · · ]. The misbehaving agents are allowed to update their state in an arbitrary way by choosing the input function u K . In particular, the misbehaving agents are said to be malicious if they can inject any arbitrary function u K , while they are said to be faulty if, given any proper subspace V of the state space, they are not able to confine the evolution of the state of the network on V.
In the malicious case, the worst case scenario for the network is considered, whereas, in the faulty case, atypical network dynamics, i.e., those lying on a subset of the state space of zero Lebesgue measure, are not taken into account. Note that our choice of keeping the matrix A fixed and of letting the class of inputs u K unspecified models also the situation in which the misbehaving agents modify some entries of the matrix A, and the case of unreliable communication edges.
Remark 1 (Complete communication graph)
If the graph associated with A is complete, then any number of misbehaving agents can be identified. Indeed, in our model, each agent receives correctly the whole state of the network after the first consensus step, so that every agent can predict the evolution of the network, and hence identify the misbehaving agents. It follows that the number of malicious agents that a linear consensus networks can tolerate needs not be less than one third of the total number of nodes.
IV. DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF MISBEHAVING

AGENTS
Given a k-connected linear consensus network of the form (5), we associate an output matrix C j with each agent j, which describes the information about the state of the network that is directly available to j. In particular, y j (t) = C j x(t), and C j = [e n1 · · · e np ]
T , {n 1 , . . . , n p } ∈ N j . The problem of ensuring trustworthy computation among the agents of the network can be divided into a detection phase, in which the presence of the misbehaving components is revealed, and an identification phase, in which the identity of the misbehaving agents is discovered. From a system theoretic perspective, both tasks require certain observability properties of the consensus system. Let I represent the identity matrix of appropriate dimensions, the zero dynamics of the linear system (A, B K , C j ) are the state trajectories invisible at the output, and can be characterized by means of the (n + p)
. The complex valuez is said to be an invariant zero of the system (A, B K , C j ) if there exists a zero state direction x 0 , and a zero input direction g such that (zI
Finally, if rank(P (z)) = n + m for all but finitely many complex values z, then the system (A, B K , C j ) is leftinvertible, i.e., there are no two distinct inputs that give rise to the same output sequence [14] . The zero dynamics are strictly related to the connectivity of the communication graph associated with the consensus algorithm.
Theorem IV.1 (Zero dynamics and connectivity) Let (A, B K , C j ) be a k-connected consensus system. If |K| ≥ k, then there exists a set K and a node j such that the triple (A, B K , C j ) has nontrivial zero dynamics. Moreover, if |K| > k, then there exists a set K and a node j such that the triple (A, B K , C j ) is not left-invertible.
Proof: Let G be the digraph associated with A, and let k be the connectivity of G. Take a set K of k + 1 malicious nodes, such that k of them form a vertex cut S of G. The network G is divided into two subnetworks G 1 , and G 3 , which communicate only through the nodes S. Assume that the misbehaving agent K \ S belongs to G 3 , while the observing node j belongs to G 1 . After relabeling the nodes, the consensus matrix A is of the form
. Let
, where x 3 is the vector containing the values of the nodes of G 3 , and let u K\S be any arbitrary nonzero function. Clearly, starting from the zero state, the values of the nodes of G 1 are constantly 0, while the subnetwork G 3 is driven by the misbehaving agent K \ S. We conclude that the triple (A, B K , C j ) is not left-invertible. Suppose now that K ≡ S as previously defined, and let u K = −A 23 x 3 . Let the initial condition of the nodes of G 1 and of S be zero. Since every state trajectory generated by x 3 = 0 does not appear in the output of the agent j, the triple (A, B K , C j ) has nontrivial zero dynamics.
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A set of misbehaving agents may remain undetected from the observations of the node j if and only if there exists an initial condition of the network such that their behavior does not appear in the output sequence y j .
Theorem IV.2 (Detectable malicious agents) Let A be a consensus matrix, let V be the nodes of the network, and let K ⊂ V be the set of malicious agents. The set K is detectable by the node j ∈ V if and only if the system (A, B K , C j ) has no nontrivial zero dynamics.
Proof: It follows directly from the properties of a strongly observable system [14] .
Following Theorem IV.2, we can state a first upper bound on the number of malicious agents that can be detected.
Theorem IV.3 (Detection of malicious agents) Given a kconnected linear consensus network, at most k−1 concurrent malicious agents can be detected by every node in the network.
Proof: Suppose there are k malicious nodes, and that the communication graph associated with the consensus system is k-connected. Let the misbehaving agents form a vertex cut. Because of Theorem IV.1, for some output matrix C j , the consensus system has nontrivial zero dynamics, so that the malicious nodes may remain undetected.
Let K 1 and K 2 be any two disjoint sets of possible misbehaving agents, and let x 1 and x 2 be the state trajectories generated by K 1 and K 2 with the inputs u 1 and u 2 . Clearly, if the difference x 1 − x 2 belongs to the null space of the output matrix C j , then it is not possible to determine from the observations of the agent j whether the set K 1 or the set K 2 is misbehaving.
Theorem IV.4 (Identifiable malicious agents) Let A be a consensus matrix, let V be the nodes of the network, and let K 1 ⊂ V be the set of malicious agents. The set K 1 is identifiable by the node j ∈ V if and only if the system (A, [B K1 B K2 ], C j ) has no nontrivial zero dynamics, for every set K 2 ⊂ V of possible misbehaving agents.
Proof: (Only if) By contradiction, let x 0 and [u 1 −u 2 ] T be a zero state direction, and a zero input sequence for the system (A, [B K1 B K2 ], C j ). We have
where B 1 and B 2 are the input matrices associated with the sets K 1 and K 2 . Therefore,
where
Clearly, since the output sequence generated by K 1 coincide with the output sequence generated by K 2 , the two sets of misbehaving nodes can not be distinguished.
(If) Recall that a system with no zero dynamics is strongly observable [14] , i.e., there exists a unique pair of initial condition and input sequence that generates the output sequence. Let K be the set containing all the possible sets of misbehaving nodes, and let K ∈ K be the set of malicious nodes. Let Y be the vector containing the output sequence of the node j. Consider the systems Σ i,l = (A, [B Ki B K l ]), with K i , K l ∈ K, and K i ∩ K l = ∅, and compute the input sequence, if any, that produces Y for every system Σ i,l . Since each system Σ il has no zero dynamics, there is a unique input sequence producing Y . In particular, whenever K i = K, the input corresponding to the set K l is zero, so that all the sets K l , such that K l ∩ K = ∅, are recognized as well-behaving, and, by exclusion, the set K is identified.
As a consequence of Theorem IV.4, if up to k malicious agents are allowed to act in the network, then a necessary and sufficient condition to correctly identify the set of malicious nodes is that the consensus system subject to any set of 2k inputs has no nontrivial zero dynamics.
Theorem IV.5 (Identification of malicious agents) Given a k-connected linear consensus network, at most k−1 2 malicious agents can be identified by every node in the network.
Proof: Let K 1 and K 2 be two sets of
agents, and let K 1 be malicious. Since 2(
+ 1) ≥ k, by Theorem IV.1 there exist K 1 , K 2 , and j such that the system (A, [B K1 B K2 ], C j ) has nontrivial zero dynamics. By Theorem IV.4, the set K 1 is not identifiable.
A complete characterization of the undetectable or unidentifiable malicious behaviors is derived from Theorem IV.4.
Theorem IV.6 (Undetectable and unidentifiable inputs)
Let A be a consensus matrix, and let K 1 ⊂ V be the set of malicious agents. The set of inputs that make the agents K 1 undetectable coincide with the zero inputs of the system (A, B K1 , C j ). Moreover, the functions u K1 that make the set K 1 undistinguishable from the set K 2 ⊂ V are such that there exists an input [u K1 u K2 ]
T that generates a zero dynamic for the system (A, [B K1 B K2 ], C j ).
Proof: It follows directly from Theorem IV.4. For a linear consensus network, Theorem IV.5 provides an alternative proof of the resilience bound first presented in [7] and later rediscovered in [9] , and Theorem IV.6 fully characterizes the behaviors for which a group of malicious agents remains unidentified from the output observations of a certain node.
In most of the practical applications, it is too restrictive to assume that the misbehaving nodes are able to generate zero dynamics, since they need to be able to steer the state along particular directions, which have zero Lebesgue measure in the state space. 2 This motivates the study of the resilience of linear consensus networks to faulty (noncolluding) attacks, which, by definition, are not allowed to generate zero dynamics. The following theorem states an upper bound on the number of faulty agents that can be detected and identified.
Theorem IV.7 (Identification of faulty agents) Given a k-connected linear consensus network, at most k − 1 concurrent faulty agents can be detected and correctly identified by every node in the network.
Proof: Since, by definition, faulty nodes do not generate zero dynamics, we only need to show that at most k−1 faulty agents can be correctly identified by every node. Suppose there are k faulty agents, and suppose that they form a vertex cut. The network is divided into two subnetworks G 1 and G 2 by the faulty nodes K. Let i be a node of G 2 , and consider the problem of understanding, from the observations of the agent j of G 1 , whether the set K or the agent i is faulty. As in the proof of Theorem IV.1, the system (A, [B 
is not left-invertible, and, since every signal starting from i reaches j through the agents K, we have B S ∩ S * i = 0. From Theorem II.1, the dynamics generated by the two sets K and i can not be decoupled, and, in particular, the set K can reproduce the output sequence generated by any u i . We conclude that j, and in fact any node in G 1 , is not able to distinguish whether i, and in fact any set of nodes in G 2 , or the set K is faulty.
Theorems IV.5 and IV.7 only give an upper bound on the maximum number of concurrent misbehaving agents that can be detected and identified. In the next section it will be shown that, generically, in order to detect and identify k malicious agents, the connectivity of the communication graph needs to be 2k + 1, while, for faulty agents, a (k + 1)-connected network is sufficient. In other words, if there exists a set of k misbehaving nodes that can not be identified by the agent j, then a random and arbitrarily small change of the consensus matrix makes the misbehaving nodes detectable and identifiable with probability one, provided that the connectivity of the communication graph is sufficiently high.
V. STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES AND GENERIC
SOLVABILITY
We will be using some known results in the field of linear structured systems, and we refer the interested reader to [15] , [16] for a detailed treatment of the subject. Given a linear structured system of the form
we associate a directed graph G = (V, E) with it. The vertex set V is given by U ∪ X ∪ Y , with U = {u 1 , . . . , u m } the set of input vertices, X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } the set of state vertices, and Y = {y 1 , . . . , y p } the set of output vertices. The indices n, m, and p denote respectively the dimension of the state space, the input space, and the output space. Denoting (i, j) for a directed edge from the vertex i to the vertex j, the edge set Theorem V.1 (Generic normal rank of a matrix pencil) Let P (z) be the system pencil of the structured system (6). The normal rank of P (z) is generically equal to n plus the size of a maximum linking from U to Y .
In other words, for almost any numerical realization Σ of the structure matrices ([A], [B], [C], [D] ), the normal rank of the pencil of Σ equals n plus the size of a maximum linking from the input to the output vertices. Recall that the union of a linking, a Y -topped path family and a cycle family is disjoint if they mutually have no vertices in common.
Theorem V.2 (Generic number of invariant zeros) Let the pencil P (z) of the structured system (6) have full column rank n + m, even after the deletion of an arbitrary row. The generic number of invariant zeros of the system (6) is equal to n minus the maximal number of vertices in X contained in the disjoint union of the following sets:
(i) a linking of size m from U to Y , (ii) a set of cycles in X, and (iii) a set of Y -topped paths. , and let P (z) be its matrix pencil. Because of Theorem V.1, P (z) has full normal rank n + |U |, so that almost any realization of ([A], [B] , [C] ) is left-invertible. Deleting the row v from P (z) corresponds to deleting all the incoming edges to the node v. Let G be the digraph associated with P (z) after deleting one of its rows. Since G is k-connected, G is at least k − 1 connected. The maximum size of a linking from U to Y is still |U |, and hence P (z) has full normal rank even after the deletion of an arbitrary row. By considering a set of n self loops in G, which are always present in our consensus model, we have that all the n vertices in X are covered, and therefore, by Theorem V. Proof: Let (A, B, C) be a nonnegative numerical instance of ([A], [B], [C] ). The set of parameters for which a generic property fails to hold coincides by definition with an algebraic hypersurface of the parameter space [16] , so that a property remains generic when the parameter set is restricted to the nonnegative orthant. Because of Theorem V.3, the triple (A, B, C) has generically no zero dynamics. Moreover, the Perron-Frobenius Theorem for nonnegative matrices ensures the existence of a positive eigenvector x for the matrix A associated with the eigenvalue of largest magnitude r [17] . Let D be the diagonal matrix whose main diagonal equals x, then the matrix r −1 D −1 AD is a consensus matrix [18] . A similarity transformation using D yields the system (D −1 AD, D −1 B, CD), which generically has also no zero dynamics. Finally, the system (r has generically no zero dynamics. By Theorem IV.4, any set of k−1 2 malicious agents is detectable and identifiable by any node in the network.
We conclude this Section with the resilience bound for the faulty agents model. Theorem V.6 (Generic identification of faulty agents) Given a k-connected consensus network, up to k − 1 faulty agents can generically be detected and correctly identified by any agent.
Proof: Let V be the set of nodes, and K ⊂ V the set of faulty agents. Let k be the connectivity of the graph associated with a structure matrix [A], and let |K| = k − 1 be the rank of the input matrix B K . By virtue of Theorem V.3, almost any numerical instance of
has no zero dynamics, regardless of the choice of j, and therefore V * K = ∅. Let i ∈ V \ K, and consider the system
Since the number of inputs in Σ i equals the connectivity of G, the system Σ i is generically left-invertible because of Theorem V.1. Therefore, B i ∩ (V * K + S * K ) = B i ∩ S * K = 0, for any set of k intruders K ∪ {i}. The dynamics of the K intruders can be fully decoupled from the output trajectory generated by any other node i, and therefore up to k − 1 faulty nodes are successfully detected and identified. Indeed, for each i ∈ V \ K, the residual associated with i in the system (A, [B K B i ], C j ) converges to zero, so that the agent i is regarded as well-behaving, and, by exclusion, the set K is identified. Note that, since the faulty agents are not allowed to inject the inputs described in Lemma IV.6, there is no other set of agents able to generate the output observations.
VI. DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION ALGORITHMS
A distributed procedure to detect and identify the misbehaving agents in a linear consensus network is in Algorithm 1. Here is an informal description.
(Exact identification) We focus on the agent j. Let k be the number of misbehaving nodes to be identified, and let K be the set containing all the n−1 k+1
combinations of k + 1 elements of V \ {j}. For each setK ∈ K, consider the system ΣK = (A, BK , C j ), and compute 3 a set of residual generator filters for ΣK . If the connectivity of the communication graph is sufficiently high, then, as described in the previous sections, each residual function is nonzero if and only if the corresponding failure mode is active. Let K be the set of misbehaving nodes, then, whenever K ⊂K, the residual function associated with the failure modeK \ K becomes zero after an initial transient, so that the agentK \ K is recognized as well-behaving. By exclusion, because the residuals associated with the misbehaving agents are always nonzero, the set K is identified. Notice that, since the residual generators are dead beat filters, the detection and the identification of the misbehaving agents take place in finite time, and that, because each agent only relies on its local observations, no communication overhead is introduced in the consensus protocol.
Algorithm 1 requires every agent to know the entire topology of the network, and to compute a number of residuals which grows exponentially with the number of nodes of the network. In a more realistic scenario each agent is only aware of the communication structure of some neighborhood, and they can perform only a certain number of operation in a reasonable amount of time. It follows that, in practice, the proposed procedure is implementable only on a small consensus network. In the sequel, we briefly present a heuristic to address this issue.
Consider the set V 
VII. EXAMPLES
A. Exact detection and identification
Consider the network of Fig. 2(a) , and let A be a randomly chosen consensus matrix. In particular, 
The network is 3-connected, and it can be verified that for any set K of 3 misbehaving agents, and for any observer node j, the triple (A, B K , C j ) is left-invertible. Also, for any set K of cardinality 2 the triple (A, B K , C j ) has no invariant zeros. As previously discussed, any well-behaving node can detect and identify up to 2 faulty agents, or up to 1 malicious agent. Consider the observations of the agent 1, and suppose that the agents {3, 7} inject a random signal into the network. As described in Algorithm 1, the agent 1 computes the residual functions for each of the 7 3 possible sets of misbehaving nodes, and identify the well-behaving agents. For example, independent of the initial condition of the network, for the system x(t + 1) = Ax(t) + B 3 u 3 (t) + B 4 u 4 (t) + B 7 u 7 (t), after 7 time steps, the residual function associated with the input 4 is zero, as in 2(b), so that the agent 4 is regarded ThBIn1.8 Fig. 2(b) a consensus network where the nodes 3 and 7 are faulty. In Fig. 2(a) the residual functions computed by the agent 1, under the hypothesis that the misbehaving set is {3, 4, 7}.
as well-behaving. The agents 3 and 7 instead, since they always have nonzero residual functions, are recognized as misbehaving. If the misbehaving nodes are malicious, then no more than 1 misbehaving node can be tolerated. Indeed, the consensus system with 4 inputs exhibits nontrivial zero dynamics, so that a set of 2 malicious nodes may remain unidentified. For example, the system (A, B {2,4,6,8} , C 1 ) has nontrivial zero dynamics, since the nodes {2, 4, 6, 8} form a vertex cut. It follows that there exists an initial condition and an input function such that the nodes {2, 4} and {6, 8} generate the same output observations, and, therefore, can not be distinguished.
B. Approximate detection and isolation
The goal of the following example is to show that an effective detection and identification mechanism can be designed using the heuristic presented in Section VI. Suppose that the network topology is as in Fig. 3(a) , and that the agents only know the structure of a 3-neighborhood, as the shaded region in Fig. 3(a) for the agent 15. We will be considering only faulty agents, because the partial knowledge of the network makes it impossible to identify malicious nodes. Suppose that the 15 red agents in Fig. 3(a) are faulty, and suppose that they add a random signal to the consensus algorithm. The agents design the residual generators for the portion of consensus network they know, and they execute 40 steps of the consensus algorithm. By comparing the residuals with a predetermined threshold, all the misbehaving agents are identified and isolated from the network, as in Fig. 3(b) . Clearly, because the identification algorithm is not exact, some communication edges are cut erroneously.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The problem of distributed reliable computation in networks with misbehaving nodes is considered, and its relationship with the fault detection and isolation problem for linear systems is discussed. The resilience of linear consensus networks to external attacks is characterized through some properties of the underlying communication graph, as well as from a system-theoretic perspective. In almost every linear consensus network, the misbehaving components can be correctly detected and identified, as long as the connectivity of the communication graph is sufficiently high. Precisely ,   10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90   100   1  11  21  31  41  51  61  71  81  91   2  12  22  32  42  52  62  72  82  92   3  13  23  33  43  53  63  73  83  93   4  14  24  34  44  54  64  74  84  94 
